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Introduction

One university; two trials; two district court outcomes: such is the case of the
University of Michigan and the divergent court opinions regarding the inclusion of race
as a factor in undergraduate and law school admissions. In the case of Gratz v.
Bollinger,2 the district court ruled in favor of race conscious admissions at the
undergraduate level; however, in Grutter v. Bollinger,3 the district court struck down the
policy at the law school. In the wait between the district court opinions in the Michigan
cases and the Supreme Court’s decisions, reversing the outcomes of the district courts, a
question of legal principle hung in the balance: can diversity in collegiate class
composition ever be a sufficiently compelling goal to permit the use of racial
classifications in the admissions process? After declining review in the cases of
Hopwood v. State of Texas 4 and Smith v. Washington, 5 the Supreme Court heard the
Michigan cases in what may be one of the most significant civil rights decisions by the
Rehenquist Court. In these cases, the Court formally endorsed race-conscious
admissions. Thus, race conscious admissions policies are constitutionally permissible, so
long as they are narrowly tailored towards advancing compelling goals. These goals
include the pursuit of the educational benefits yielded through a diverse student body. In
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this vein, the Court fully embraced the diversity rationale as proffered by Justice Powell
in Bakke v. Board of Regents6 and followed by educational institutions for the last
twenty-five years.
The present inquiry focuses on identifying a potential relationship between the
introduction of social science evidence at trial and judicial assessment of the costs and
benefits of diversity, within the educational context. Given the politically charged nature
of the affirmative action debate, with many people having entrenched, diametrically
opposed views, 7 and the relative novelty of social science on the costs and benefits of
diversity, it may be the case that the influence of social science evidence is limited. As
the expenditures of the University of Michigan on expert witnesses throughout the course
of the Michigan cases were considerable,8 it is appropriate to assess, in a pragmatic
sense, the degree to which such expenditures are warranted. In short, does employment
of expert witnesses increase the likelihood for college and university defendants in race
conscious admissions suits?
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In Part II, I briefly review the landscape of equal protection law between the
Supreme Court’s decisions in Bakke and Grutter. Part III presents an analysis of the role
of social science evidence in race conscious admissions cases, utilizing a set of district
and circuit court decisions arising between Bakke and Grutter. Here I compare the
outcomes of these decisions with the presence or absence of social science evidence at
trial, utilizing a set of race conscious admissions cases spanning K-12 and higher
education. Part IV concludes with the assessment of the role of social science evidence
in the outcome of the Supreme Court’s decisions in Gratz and Grutter.

II. The Landscape of Race Conscious Admissions Cases From Bakke to Grutter

A. Jurisprudential Divisions Over Strict Scrutiny and the Bakke Decision

From the late 1970s into the early 1990s the Supreme Court issued a series of
decisions, shaping the broader contours of equal protection law with respect to the
permissibility of affirmative action policies in both purpose (compelling interest) and
policy form (narrow tailoring).9 This period is marked by jurisprudential battles over the
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Black’s Law Dictionary defines affirmative action as, “[a] set of actions designed to eliminate
existing and continuing discrimination, to remedy lingering effects of past discrimination, and to create
systems and procedures to prevent future discrimination.” Bryan A. Garner, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 64
(8th ed. 2004). The Modern Dictionary for the Legal Profession goes so far as to state that “[t]the
constitutionality of many of these programs is uncertain because the programs themselves may
impermissibly discriminate.” Gerry W. Beyer, Kenneth R. Redden, and Margaret Beyer, Eds., THE
MODERN DICTIONARY FOR THE LEGAL PROFESSION, 20 (2001). Within the context of this paper, a broader
conception of affirmative action will be used as the focus of this inquiry is not to address past
discrimination, but the use of race conscious admissions to gain the benefits of a racially diverse student
body. For purposes of a working definition of affirmative action, this paper draws upon an alternative
definition articulated by Catharine R. Stimpson, Dean of the Graduate School of Arts and Science New
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issues of the appropriate standard of review for benign race conscious policies, strict
versus intermediate scrutiny, and whether the standard of review should vary given the
level of government, federal versus state and local. Of concern is the burden accorded
the defendant governmental entities when employing race conscious measures. Given
our nation’s history of de jure segregation and other invidious racially and ethnically
targeted measures, the Court is inherently suspicious of measures including terms
designating people along racial/ ethnic lines. While the Court’s heightened suspicion
protects individuals against direct discrimination by the government, it also constrains the
flexibility of governmental entities in addressing the lingering effects of past injustices
and aiding the building of an inclusive, pluralistic society.10
Historically, strict scrutiny has meant the death knell of any policy to which it is
applied, with few exceptions.11 Strict scrutiny requires that the government prove that its
interest in the proffered policy - the goal the government seeks - is compelling. In

York University, in the March/ April 1993 edition of Change magazine. According to this definition,
affirmative action is
[a]n umbrella term for a broader set of activities that public and private
institutions have voluntarily undertaken in order to increase diversity,
equity, and opportunity. Here, affirmative action is an institutional
policy and spirit. Affirmative action so defined also embodies two
strategies for the achievement of its goals. One is to erase inequities, for
example, to fund both men's and women's athletics fully, without cavil.
The second is to create a community that prizes diversity and
differences.” Catharine R. Stimpson, Rethinking Affirmative Action, 25
CHANGE 2 (1993).
10

See, Kim Forde-Mazuri, The Constitutional Implications of Race-Neutral Affirmative Action, 88
GEORGETOWN L.J. 2232, 2340-2346 (2000).
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Until Grutter v. Bollinger, in all but one occasion, U.S. v. Paradise, 480 U.S. 149 (1987), racebased classifications did not survive strict scrutiny since the inception of the strict scrutiny concept in
Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944). The adage “strict in theory, but fatal in fact” was coined
by Gerald Gunther, In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Model for a Newer Equal
Protection. 86 HARVARD L. REV. 1 (1972). For a further discussion of the effects of strict scrutiny see M.
L. Manuel, Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena: Is Strict Scrutiny Fatal in Fact for Governmental
Affirmative Action Programs, 31 NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW 975 (1997).
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addition the nexus between the goal sought and the policy enacted must be tight and
direct, what the Court calls narrowly tailored. In effect, under strict scrutiny the burden
between protecting innocent third parties and addressing injustice and/ or promoting
diversity is thrown in favor of the innocents and protecting targeted classes from the
perverse effects of benign policies.12 Traditionally, the standard of intermediate scrutiny
is more lenient, albeit slightly, requiring the government to show merely that the
proffered goal is important and that there is a substantial relationship between that goal
and the policy.13
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See Forde-Mazuri, supra note 10 at 2359-2364.
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The Supreme Court in Frontiero v. Richardson announced that a heightened standard was
necessary when reviewing sex-based classifications. 411 U.S. 677, 93 S. Ct. 1764 (1973)(invalidating a
military rule which permitted servicemen to automatically claim their spouses as dependents, but required
servicewomen to prove that their spouses were dependent in fact). However, it wasn’t until three years
later, in Craig v. Boren, when the Supreme Court articulated the intermediate scrutiny standard as we have
come to know it. 429 U.S. 190, 97 S. Ct. 451 (1976)(invalidating an Oklahoma law denying 18 year old
men from purchasing 3.2% beer, but allowing the purchase of such beer by young women of the same age).
Note that the above text provides the “black letter” discussion of the tiers of scrutiny as enunciated
by the Supreme Court. However, the Court’s practice often deviates from the proffered standards.
According to University of California Professor Ashutosh Bhagwat,
despite its sweeping embrace of the concept of tiered review, the
Supreme Court has paid essentially no attention to the practical details
of that review. … [T]he Court has failed to develop any coherent
framework regarding how, in applying the tiers of scrutiny, courts are
to assess whether the governmental interest asserted satisfies the
requirements of the level of scrutiny at issue. Affirmative Action and
Compelling Interests: Equal Protection Jurisprudence at the
Crossroads, 4 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA JOURNAL OF
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 260, 270 (2002).
Finding a pattern of review, Randall Kelso, Professor of Law, South Texas College of Law, argues that the
Court employs a base plus six levels of heightened scrutiny (a base of rational basis review, plus two levels
of heightened rational basis review, two levels of intermediate scrutiny and two tiers of strict scrutiny),
reflecting variations in the level of review and the nexus between the policy and governmental interest. In
addition to those seven levels of review, three additional tiers could be added based on recent decisions
adding language, such as the phrase “exceedingly persuasive” to intermediate scrutiny in the VMI decision.
Standards of Review under the Equal Protection Clause and Related Constitutional Doctrines Protecting
Individual Rights: The "Base Plus Six" Model and Modern Supreme Court Practice, 4 UNIVERSITY OF
PENNSYLVANIA JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 5 (2002). Others have argued that the Court engages
in an ad hoc balancing of interests, under the guise of heightened scrutiny. See Ashutosh Bhagwat, Hard
Cases and the (D)evolution of Constitutional Doctrine, 30 CONNECTICUT LAW REVIEW, 961 (1998) and
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This abridged legal overview begins in 1978 with the Supreme Court’s decision in
University of California Board of Regents v. Bakke.14 Bakke is a significant milestone
when considering race conscious admissions as it is the first case in which the Supreme
Court rendered a decision on the merits of race conscious admissions.15
The case of Allan Bakke began in 1973 when Bakke applied to the medical school
at the University of California at Davis (UC-Davis). The medical school scored applicant
up to 500 points based on one’s grade point average (GPA), Medical College Admissions
Test (MCAT) scores, letters of recommendation, extracurricular activities, and other
biographical information. While Bakke was thought to be a “very desirable applicant to
[the] medical school”,16 his application was denied along with all other general
admissions applicants with a score below 470.17
Concurrent with the general admissions procedure at UC-Davis Medical School
was a special admissions procedure designed to increase the number of “disadvantaged”
minorities at the school. The special admissions procedure weighed candidates’
qualifications similar to that in the general admissions procedure, except that special
admissions candidates had to be of a racial minority background and prove social and/ or

David L. Faigman, Normative Constitutional Fact-Finding - Exploring the Empirical Component of
Constitutional Interpretation, 139 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW, 541 (1991). Most
recently scholars argue that the level of review employed in the Grutter decision was not strict, but
intermediate scrutiny. See, e.g., Gail Heriot, Thoughts on Grutter v. Bollinger and Gratz v. Bollinger as
Law and as Practical Politics, 36 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 137 (2004).
14

Id. at 265 (1978).
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The first case was DeFunis v. Odegaard, 416 U.S. 312, which involved a race conscious policy
at the University of Washington School of Law (1974). That case was dismissed for mootness as the
plaintiff’s graduation from the school of law was imminent at the time the case was heard by the Court.
16

438 U.S.. at 276.
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Id.
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economic disadvantage. In addition candidates needed to show they were not subject to
the automatic 2.5 GPA cut off.18
In 1973 there were eight slots allotted for special admissions, four of which were
unfilled at the time the medical school rejected Bakke’s application. Bakke was neither
considered for these slots, nor wait-listed. Bakke mailed a letter to the Associate Dean
and Chairman of the Admissions committee, Dr. George H. Lowrey, protesting the
application process, stating that the special admissions procedure functioned as an illegal
quota.19 Bakke reapplied in 1974 and his relative score dropped substantially to 549 out
of 600. Again, Bakke was rejected outright with seats in the special admissions program
to spare, slots that were filled with students with significantly lower grade point averages
and MCAT exam scores.20
Bakke filed suit with the Superior Court of California, seeking to compel his
admission to UC-Davis, alleging that he was excluded from the school on the basis of his
race in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause, Title VI of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. 2000d, and Article I of the California Constitution.
The court ruled that the special admissions procedure acted as an illegal racial quota as it
did not allow for the comparison of candidates from the special and general admissions
pools. However, the court stopped short of compelling Bakke’s admission, as Bakke had
not proven that but for the quota he would have been admitted.21 Bakke appealed this
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Id. at 272-273.
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Id. at 276.
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Id. at 277.
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Id. at 278-279.
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latter part of the decision directly to the California Supreme Court, which accepted,
finding the issues raised in the case to be of significant import.22 The California Supreme
Court assumed, arguendo, that the medical school’s goals of integrating the student body
and thereby the medical profession, as well as improving minority healthcare, were
compelling, but that the procedures employed were not narrowly tailored towards those
goals.23 The court specifically stated, “no applicant may be rejected because of his race,
in favor of another who is less qualified, as measured by standards applied without regard
to race” and enjoined the school from using race as a factor in its admissions policies. 24
The Board of Regents appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court. Writing for an
equally divided court, Justice Powell affirmed the dissolution of the UC-Davis policy
under the rubric of strict scrutiny, with the approval of Justice Stevens, Chief Justice
Burger, Justices Stewart and Rehenquist, but reversed the decision insofar as it
summarily banned affirmative action in admissions. Justices Brennan, Marshall,
Blackmun and White supported this latter action.
Neither of the factions signed off on Powell’s benefits of a diverse student body
justification for the use of race conscious admissions,25 which according to Powell
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See, Bakke v. The Regents of the University of California, 553 P. 2d 1152, 1156 (1976).
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See Id. at 1165 (“The two major aims of the University are to integrate the student body and to
improve medical care for minorities. In our view, the University has not established that a program which
discriminates against white applicants because of their race is necessary to achieve either of these goals.”).
24
Id. at 1166.
25

Justice Brennan later refers to the diversity in education justification in Metro Broadcasting
where he discusses Justice Powell’s opinion on diversity as if it was the proper statement of the law:
Just as a “’diverse student body’” contributing to a ‘robust exchange of
ideas’ is a ‘constitutionally permissible goal’” on which a race-conscious
university admissions program may be predicated, Regents of University
of California v. Bakke, [citations omitted] the diversity of views and
information on the airwaves serves important First Amendment values.
Metro Broadcasting, 497 U.S. at 568.

9

“clearly is a constitutionally permissible goal for an institution of higher education” as
part of an institution’s academic freedom to encourage the “robust exchange of ideas” as
protected by the First Amendment. Citing Keyishian v. Board of Regents,26 Powell
asserted that the belief that an atmosphere of “speculation, experiment and creation” is an
essential quality of higher education is widely held and a student body that is diverse in
its ideas and mores creates this atmosphere. Students from different backgrounds
“whether it be ethnic, geographic, culturally advantaged or disadvantaged – may bring to
a professional school of medicine experiences, outlooks, and ideas that enrich the training
of its student body and better equip its graduates to render with understanding their vital
service to humanity.”27
How Justice Powell arrived at the conclusion that diversity serves a compelling
purpose is unclear. In Bakke he cited then Princeton President William Bowen’s editorial
to Princeton alumni that discussed, without specific data analysis, the benefits of a
diverse class.28 According to legal scholar and Dean of the University of Virginia School
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Keyishian involved a regulation requiring teachers at state universities in New York to pledge
an oath that they had not engaged in treasonable or seditious conversation or acts. The Supreme Court
struck down the law as violating academic freedom as protected by the First Amendment. Keyishan, 385
U.S. 589 (1967).
27

Bakke, 438 U.S. at 314.

28

Bakke, 438 U.S. at 314. In Bakke, briefs by amici, friends of the court, may have also played a
role. On the one hand, support for affirmative action in admissions was provided by the American Bar
Association, the American Civil Liberties Union, the National Association for the Advancement of Colored
People, the Association of American Law Schools, as well as the American Association for Medical
Colleges, several universities and the National Council of Churches. Jewish organizations including the
American Jewish Committee and the Anti-Defamation League of B’nai B’rith generally opposed the
policy, given the history of the use of quotas to restrain Jewish American enrollments at elite institutions.
The government weighed in as well with the second African American Solicitor General Wade McCree,
the first being Thurgood Marshall, presenting a brief, written by conservative jurist then attorney Frank
Easterbrook, which condemned the sixteen-seat set aside as per se unconstitutional. Other parts of the
Solicitor General’s brief reflected the office infighting and were generally dismissed by Justice Powell. For
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of Law, John Jeffries, a few years prior to the decision in Bakke, Justice Powell was
recounted as being “doubtful of the educational policy” supporting the University of
Washington Law School’s affirmative action policy challenged in DeFunis v.
Odegaard.29 On the other hand, Powell found the policy within the institution’s
purview.30
While Powell ultimately endorsed diversity as a valid policy goal, he did disagree
as to the mechanics of the UC-Davis policy. Instead he offered the admissions policy of
Harvard, the “Harvard Plan”, as a counter factual to the Davis policy. While employing
the same aims, the Harvard Plan took into account a plethora of factors of which race was
but one, a “racial plus”. In addition, all students were considered for all seats.31
According to Jefferies, holding out the Harvard Plan was a pragmatic strategy. Thus,
while the ends of the UC-Davis and Harvard approaches may have been similar, the
rigidity of the UC-Davis policy gave the appearance of blatant discrimination by
institutions.32 In Powell’s own words,
[i]t has been suggested that an admissions program which
considers race only as one factor is simply a subtle and more
sophisticated -- but no less effective -- means of according
racial preference than the Davis program. A facial intent to
discriminate, however, is evident in petitioner's preference
program and not denied in this case. No such facial infirmity
exists in an admissions program where race or ethnic

more information on Justice Powell’s thoughts on race conscious admissions see John Jeffries, JUSTICE
LEWIS F. POWELL, JR., 455-501 (1994).
29

416 U.S. 312 (1974).
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Jeffries, supra note 28 at 461.
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Bakke, 438 U.S. at 316-318.

32

Jeffries, supra note 28 at 484-485.
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background is simply one element -- to be weighed fairly
against other elements -- in the selection process.33

Until the 1990s, general consensus among colleges and universities indicated that
Powell’s approach was in fact the opinion of the Court and hence race conscious
admissions became a national norm.

B. Equal Protection Jurisprudence Post-Bakke

Throughout the eighties and into the nineties, divisions over the appropriate
standard of review remained. In 1980 the Court in Fullilove v. Klutznick upheld a
congressionally-sponsored program awarding ten-percent of all federal construction
projects to minority contractors.34 While a majority of six members of the Court
supported this conclusion, this majority was divided equally as to whether benign race
conscious measures should be subjected to strict or intermediate scrutiny.
Within the education context, the Court in Wygant v. Jackson Board of Education
struck down a collective bargaining agreement that included a race-conscious stipulation
to prevent the loss of faculty diversity in the case of a layoff.35 The stipulation provided
that in the event of lay-offs, they would occur on the basis of seniority, except that the
percentage of minority teachers laid-off could not exceed the percentage of minority
teachers employed at the time of the layoff. In 1986 the Court in five separate opinions, a
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Bakke, 438 U.S. at 318.
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448 U.S. 448 (1980).

35

476 U.S. 267 (1986).
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majority of the Court struck down the provision as violating the equal protection clause.
However, there is no singular rationale from the court on this matter.
Germane to the issue of race conscious admissions, Justice O’Connor in Wygant
acknowledged the confusion generated by the Court’s split, but confirmed support for the
idea that under appropriate conditions race conscious policies generally, admissions
policies in particular, are constitutional. She writes, “although its precise contours are
uncertain, a state interest in the promotion of racial diversity has been found sufficiently
‘compelling,’ at least in the context of higher education, to support the use of racial
considerations in furthering that interest.”36
One year after Wygant, in 1987, the Court held true to O’Connor’s dicta that race
conscious policies were not per se illegal. In U.S. v. Paradise 37 the Court upheld
Alabama Department of Public Safety’s race conscious policy aimed towards remediating
prior open and pervasive discriminatory conduct by the Department. This is the first case
in which a race-based classification survived strict scrutiny since the inception of the
strict scrutiny concept in Korematsu v. United States.38
In 1989, the Court decided the case of City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., in
which the City of Richmond, Virginia modeled its minority business program after the
one upheld by the Court in Fullilove, allowing 30 percent of contracts to be awarded to
minority firms.39 Here, the Court struck down the city’s policy requiring prime

36

Id. at 286.
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480 U.S. 149 (1987).

38

323 U.S. 214 (1944). The next time would not be until 2003 when the Court decided Grutter v.
Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003).
39

488 U.S. 469 (1989).
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contractors to subcontract to minority business enterprises, under the stringent standards
of strict scrutiny. Justice O’Connor, writing for the majority, asserts that strict scrutiny is
the appropriate standard of review for all racial classifications, insidious or benign, as
applied to states and localities. She reasons that it is difficult to assess governmental
motivations and recites potential perverse effects stemming from ostensibly benign
policies.40 The idea here is that, among other considerations, even when the government
has the best of intents, it may be harming the targeted group by perpetuating negative
stereotypes.41 The Court also found that while generally the remediation of the effects of
past discrimination was valid, the second prong of strict scrutiny, narrow tailoring, was
not satisfied, in part, for evidentiary reasons.
The City of Richmond’s proffer of statistics, which confirmed that nationally
there were disproportionately fewer minority contractors, failed to provide specific data
regarding the state of minority contracting in Richmond.42 From the Court’s view, this
seemed to be significant folly on the part of the City of Richmond. Here the Court was
looking for evidence documenting discrimination in awards of city contracts and/ or of
disparities in awards along racial lines.43 With respect to the latter, the disparity would
need to be evidenced by the compared ratios of contracts awarded to qualified minority

40

41

Id. at 493-494.
Id.

42

See Id. at 487– 491(generally distinguishing the Court’s decision in Fullilove from the facts
presented in Croson on federalism grounds) and id. at 500-503 (specifically focusing on the dearth of
evidence germane to the issue of disparities in the award of city contracts to minority firms). The Court
seemed particularly concerned about the awarding of minority contracts in a city in which African
Americans constituted about half of the population and held five of nine city council seats. Id. at 495-496.
43

Id. at 500.
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firms versus contracts awarded to majority firms.44 The city’s data only compared the
number of minority-awarded contracts to the general population and not to the pool of
qualified minority contractors. In addition, in terms of the award of minority contracts,
the city allowed for any nationally underrepresented firm to apply, rather than those
groups historically discriminated against in and around the City of Richmond.45
The next year, in 1990, the Court in Metro Broadcasting v. Federal
Communications Commission applied intermediate scrutiny to a federal program, finding
diversity in broadcasting an important governmental goal under the rubric of intermediate
scrutiny.46 Five years later, in Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, the Court reversed. 47
The dispute in Adarand involved a federal construction contract, which included
incentives for contractors to employ small, disadvantaged minority firms. Here, the
Court announced that the appropriate standard for review for all race conscious measures
is strict scrutiny.
Writing for the majority once again, O’Connor specifically stated her desire to
dispel the characterization of strict scrutiny as strict in theory, but fatal in fact. However,
in the one case she cites for this proposition, Paradise,48 she along with Justices
Rehenquist and Scalia dissented from the majority’s approval of the state’s program to
remediate open and pervasive discriminatory conduct by the Alabama Department of

44

Id. at 501-502.

45

Id.

46

497 U.S. 547 (1990).

47

515 U.S. 200 (1995).

48

480 U.S. 149 (1987).
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Public Safety. It is not until O’Connor’s opinion in Grutter v. Bollinger,49 upholding the
Michigan Law School’s race conscious admissions policy, that she “makes good” on the
Adarand assertion, rendering the seemingly fatal impact of strict scrutiny a function of
policy construction rather than application of strict scrutiny per se.
Majority opinions in both Adarand and Bakke rely on the strict scrutiny standard
of review as a basis for analyzing the constitutionality of race conscious public policies.
However, the burden of proof seems to have increased. Whereas in Bakke, Justice
Powell could in part anchor his diversity rationale William Bowen’s editorial to Princeton
alumni; by Croson, the Court is looking for location and inquiry specific data. In
addition, between the deep divisions in the Court at the time of Bakke and the seventeen
years of uneven, non-linear precedent by the Supreme Court, it became unclear how
much of Powell’s opinion in Bakke was still a valid guide.
General consensus among colleges and universities that Bakke remained “good
law” was shattered in 1996, when the Fifth Circuit announced in its decision of Hopwood
v. The State of Texas that racial diversity could never be a sufficient justification for raceconscious admissions. According to that court “diversity in higher education contradicts,
rather than furthers, the aims of equal protection” and as such is contrary to the intended
purpose of the Fourteenth Amendment.50 While it was the first circuit to address the
issue of race conscious admissions post-Bakke, the fifth circuit was hardly the last.
The Hopwood decision ushered in a new wave of litigation over race conscious
admissions. At the turn of the century, from Hopwood to the Michigan cases, admissions

49

539 U.S. 306 (2003).

50

Hopwood, 78 F.3d at 945.
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policies at four public universities, the elite high schools of Boston, and transfer policies
at several magnet schools were challenged for their explicit use of racial criteria.
Without clear direction from the Supreme Court as to how Justice Powell’s framework
for understanding race conscious admissions fit into the broader context of the legality of
affirmative action under equal protection, district and circuit courts proceeded to handle
the cases before them. Expressing frustration over the confusion that emerged, Judge
Wiener in his Hopwood concurrence stated
Between the difficulty inherent in applying Bakke and the
minimal guidance in Adarand, the definition and
application of the compelling interest inquiry seems to be
suspended somewhere in the interstices of constitutional
interpretation. Until further clarification issues from the
Supreme Court defining “compelling interest” (or telling
us how to know one when we see one), I perceive no
“compelling” reason to rush in where the Supreme Court
fears – or at least declines – to tread.51

The lack of clear Supreme Court guidance, to which Judge Wiener alludes, left district
and circuit court judges on their own to parse the precedents before them. A circuit split
resulted.
The circuit split emerged in 2002, when the sixth circuit in a 5-4 enbanc decision
upheld the University of Michigan’s law school policy under Justice Powell’s guidelines
established in Bakke.52 In this case, Grutter v. Bollinger, Barbara Grutter applied to the
University of Michigan’s law school in 1996, with fairly strong qualifications: a 3.8
undergraduate grade point average and an LSAT score of 161. Her scores were strong

51

78 F.3d at 964-965.

52

Grutter v. Bollinger, 288 F.3d 732 (6th Cir. 2002).
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enough to get her on the waitlist, but not enough to gain admittance.53 In a parallel case,
Gratz v. Bollinger, Jennifer Gratz and Patrick Hamacher applied to the University of
Michigan’s College of Literature, Arts and Sciences in 1995 and 1997, respectively.
Gratz was informed that she was “well qualified,” but that “she was ‘less competitive
than the students who had been admitted on first review.'"54 Hamacher’s scores also
placed him within the range of qualified applicants, “they [were] not at the level needed
for first review admission.”55 Both University of Michigan schools contained affirmative
action policies that considered race as a factor in admissions decisions. However, the
policies took different approaches in making this consideration.
At the law school, the policy blended the use of: an index undergraduate grade
point averages (UGPA) and law school admissions test scores (LSAT); consideration of
other student characteristics, essays, enthusiasm of recommenders, quality of
undergraduate institution, difficulty of undergraduate curriculum, and potential for
unique contributions to intellectual and social life in law school.56 The undergraduate
plan in Gratz, however, assigned specific point values with a maximum of 150 points.
These point values were: academic factors (110 point maximum); 20 points for
membership in an underrepresented minority group, socioeconomic disadvantage,
attendance at a predominantly minority high school, athletics, or Provost discretion; as

53

Grutter, 539 U.S. 306, 324.

54

Gratz, 539 U.S. 244, 249.

55

Id.

56

Grutter, 539 U.S. at 324.
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well as points for residency, legacy, personal achievement, essay, leadership, and
service.57
At the district court, Judge Friedman in Grutter v. Bollinger found the law
school’s policy to violate Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as he failed to find a
compelling state interest in diversity. Furthermore, as race neutral alternatives had not
been exhausted, among other matters, Judge Friedman found the law school’s policy as
failing to meet narrow tailoring standards.58 On the other hand, Judge Duggan in Gratz v.
Bollinger generally found the principle of diversity compelling, relying on Bakke as
precedent and the social science evidence presented at trial, upholding under summary
judgment the undergraduate admissions policy in place for 1999 and 2000.59 Both
decisions were appealed to the Sixth Circuit, where a majority reversed Judge Friedman
in Grutter, upholding the law school’s policy.60 A decision on the undergraduate case,
Gratz v. Bollinger, was not reached, however.

61

Amid controversy over procedural matters,62 the Supreme Court granted certiorari
to both University of Michigan cases. In 2003 the Supreme Court upheld the

57

See Gratz, 539 U.S. at 253-257 (detailing the undergraduate admissions policies from 1995
through 2000).
58

Grutter, 137 F.Supp.2d at 872.

59

Gratz, 122 F.Supp.2d at 831. Prior policies, however, were found constitutionally infirm. Id. at
831-833, 836.
60

288 F.3d at 752.

61

Given the closeness of the issues in the Michigan cases, the Supreme Court agreed resolve both
cases, granting certiorari before judgment in the Gratz case. Gratz, 537 U.S. 1044 (2002).
62

The controversy over alleged procedural irregularities is detailed in the appendix to Judge
Boggs’ dissent, Id. at 810-815, and is discussed in Sheryl G. Snyder, Gratz and Grutter in Context: A
Comment on the Litigation Strategy, Judicial Politics and Political Context Which Produced Grutter and
Gratz. 92 Ky. L.J. 241 (2003).
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constitutionality of narrowly tailored race conscious admissions policies aimed at
advancing the educational benefits of diversity.63 While the Court found the university’s
interest in advancing the educational benefits of diversity compelling in both cases, in the
undergraduate case, Gratz v. Bollinger,64 the Court found that the policy was
constitutionally infirm as it routinely applied a set amount of points, 20 out of 150, to
racial and ethnic considerations. This infirmity stemmed both from the weight of the
consideration of race, one-fifth of the automatic admission cut off of 100 points, and the
mechanical application of the points, comparable to the quota used by UC-Davis medical
school in the Bakke case.65 By comparison, the law school policy at issue in Grutter v.
Bollinger reviewed a broader array of factors to be considered individually when
determining admissions decisions. For that reason, among others, it was considered
narrowly tailored and the least restrictive means for attaining a diverse student body.66

63

Grutter, 539 U.S. 306 (2003).

64

539 U.S. 244 (2003).

65

Id. at 272-274.
See Grutter, 539 U.S. at 336 -343 for the majority’s opinion on the complicity of the law
school’s plan with narrow tailoring. For a fuller discussion of the Gratz and Grutter opinions see Lackland
H. Bloom, Jr., Grutter and Gratz: A Critical Analysis, 41 Hous. L. Rev. 459 (2004).
66
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III.

Social Science Evidence in Race Conscious Admissions Cases

A. The Evidentiary Question in Race Conscious Admissions Cases

The divergent approaches district and circuit court judges took in analyzing the
constitutional validity of race conscious admissions policies provide a set of seventeen
cases wherein one can explore the degree to which social science evidence is influential
in the outcomes of these cases. Four of these cases arise in the higher education
context.67 The other thirteen are from K-12 voluntary desegregation cases. Given the
small number of higher education cases, the addition of K-12 cases helps to fill out the
analysis. Furthermore, the general constitutional inquiry is parallel: whether or not
diversity is a compelling governmental interest sufficient to justify race conscious
integration plans.
For purposes of this inquiry, the seventeen cases are subdivided to present the
opinions of 47 district and circuit court judges. Seven judges are excluded from the
numerical counts presented in the table below, as they are decided on state law grounds.68

67

Note that the case of Podberesky v. Kirwan, 38 F.3d 147 (4th Cir. 1994) is not included in this
analysis as the context of Podberesky differs from other race conscious admissions cases in the field of
education. In particular, Podberesky arises in the context of financial aid, specifically race-specific
scholarships. While an offer of admissions and a financial aid award are tied to a students’ ability to enroll
in a particular institution, the institutional decision to permit entry to the university and give financial aid
are distinct. The presence or absence of financial aid in this context renders it more likely that a student
will attend a particular school, rather than enabling their ability to attend college at all. Cf. Michael A.
Olivas, Constitutional criteria: The social science and common law of admissions decisions in higher
education. 68 COLORADO LAW REVIEW, 1065 (1997) arguing that the context of financial aid and
admissions are tied, such that the financial aid consideration is part of the admissions decision from the
perspective of an applicant.
68

Cases arising in the State of Washington were ultimately disposed of under Initiative 200 (I200), also known as the Washington State Civil Rights Initiative. Implemented November 3, 1998, I-200
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The decisions excluded include Ninth Circuit’s opinions in Smith v. University of
Washington 69 and Parents Involved in Community Schools v. School Dist. No. 1 70 and
the district court opinion in Smith.71 Also note that only one opinion per judge is included
so as not to over-represent a particular judge’s approach to the cases. For that reason
Judge Gertner’s opinion in Boston’s Children First v. City of Boston,72 Judge Bryan’s
opinion in Tito v. Arlington County School Board 73 and Judge Edenfield’s opinions in
Tracy v. Board of Regents 74and Wooden v. Board of Regents,75 both involving
admissions at the University of Georgia, are also excluded from the total count. These
cases are, however, noted in the analysis below. The total number of judges included in
the count is 40.
Overall, nearly two-thirds of all judges hearing race conscious admissions cases
between Bakke and Grutter ruled in favor of plaintiff students, 25 out of 40. Yet the
odds of a judge ruling in favor of defendants improved relative to plaintiffs to about 5050 when social science evidence was presented at trial. This happens as the odds of

states that: “the state shall not discriminate against, or grant preferential treatment to, any individual or
group on the basis of race, sex, color, ethnicity, or national origin in the operation of public employment,
public education, or public contracting”. WASH. REV. CODE § 49.60 (1998). This initiative is modeled
after California’s Proposition 209.
69

233 F.3d 1188 (9th Cir. 2000), cert. denied, 532 U.S. 1051 (2001).

70

285 F.3d 1236 (9th Cir. 2002).

71

2 F.Supp. 2d 1324 (WA 1998).

72

62 F.Supp. 2d 247 (MA 1999).

73

1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7932 (VA 1997) (unpublished opinion).

74

59 F.Supp. 2d1314 (GA 1999).

75

32 F.Supp. 2d 1370 (GA 1999).
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Table 1 - Judicial Rulings for Plaintiffs and Defendants by the Presence or Absence of
Social Science Evidence at Trial
Plaintiff Defendant
Total
Wins
Wins
Social Science Evidence
8
9
17
No Social Science Evidence
17
6
23
25
15
40
Total

of plaintiffs wins decreased from just over two-thirds (17 of 25) to one-third (8 of 25)
when social science evidence was introduced and the odds of defendant wins increased
by one-third.
Looking at the numbers from a legal analysis perspective, by definition, there are
only plaintiff wins when judges find a compelling governmental interest in diversity.
Thus the fifteen plaintiff wins represent the fifteen opinions in which these judges state
that diversity is a compelling governmental interest. On the other hand, only four judges
find that as a matter of law, diversity is not compelling.76
In the majority of opinions, a total of 21 judges express uncertainty as to whether
diversity is compelling. Generally, these courts raise two concerns: the first concern is
evidentiary; the second is legal. Identifying the legal question is rather straightforward.
The legal question regards the status of Justice Powell’s opinion as good law and
whether courts should rely on that opinion. For example, assuming Powell’s opinion was
good law, the Fourth and Eleventh Circuits specifically withheld judgment on whether

76

These judges include two of the three circuit court judges in Hopwood, 78 F.3d at 944 (“We
agree with the plaintiffs that any consideration of race or ethnicity by the law school for the purpose of
achieving a diverse student body is not a compelling interest under the Fourteenth Amendment.”); Judge
Friedman in Grutter, 137 F. Supp. 2d at 850 (“The court does not doubt that racial diversity in the law
school population may provide these educational and societal benefits. … Nonetheless, the fact remains
that the attainment of a racially diverse class is not a compelling state interest because it was not recognized
as such by Bakke...”); and, Judge Edenfield in the University of Georgia cases, Johnson, 106 F.Supp. 2d at
1374-1375 (“[T]he "diversity" interest is so inherently formless and malleable that no plan can be narrowly
tailored to fit it.”).
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the institutions proved that in their specific context diversity was compelling. These
courts then decided the cases of Johnson v. Board of Regents of the University of
Georgia, 77 Tuttle v. Arlington County School Board,78 and Eisenberg v. Montgomery
County Public Schools 79 on narrow tailoring grounds.80
The evidentiary question, however, is more intricate. The compelling interest the
Supreme Court found in the educational benefits of diversity is a question of law,
supported by social facts. While the Supreme Court has not given a bright-line rule
signaling the distinction, the general guideline is that empirical inquiries, revolving
around a specific set of events is an inquiry of fact. For these cases, the trial court as
finder of fact is best suited to assess facts presented at trial. The overturning of such an
assessment is only by an appellate court’s finding of clear error.81 However, questions in
which an issue or policy centers “on the values society wishes to promote” along with
questions requiring rote application of law are questions of law.82 Legal questions may

77

263 F.3d 1234 (11th Cir. 2001).

78

195 F.3d 698 (4th Cir. 1999).

79

197 F.3d 123 (4th Cir. 1999).

80

Treatment of the narrow tailoring inquiry during this time between Bakke and Grutter is of
independent import and is explored in Crystal Gafford Muhammad, Form or Substance: Does policy
structure or rationale influence the constitutionality of race-conscious admissions policies?, a paper
presented at the American Education Researcher Association’s Annual Conference (April 2003).
81

See, Kelly Kunsch, Standard of Review (State and Federal): A Primer, 18 SEATTLE UNIVERSITY
LAW REVIEW 11(1994).
82

Id. at 22.
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be mixed with factual inquiries, the mixture of which, for the purpose of maintaining a
consistent system of laws, can be subjected to de novo review at the appellate level.83
For example, in the case of Stell v. Savannah-Chatham County Board of
Education the district court held that the Supreme Court wrongly assessed the facts in
Brown v. Board of Education, and on the basis of the facts before the district court
declared, “education is best given in separate schools.”84 As properly assessed by the
Fifth Circuit in Stell, the Supreme Court in Brown issued a statement of law announcing
the inherent inequality of segregation. That law, however, was merely informed by the
social science evidence presented.
As in the case of desegregation, the policy implications for the Court’s decisions
in Gratz and Grutterare broad, impacting accessibility to eli te educational institutions
and the propensity for the upward socioeconomic mobility of all Americans. Thus, when
Justice Powell stated that diversity serves a compelling purpose, it was a statement of
law, referencing William Bowen’s Princeton alumni editorial. That editorial discussed,
without specific data analysis, the benefits of a diverse class.85

83

See Adam Hoffman, Corralling Constitutional Fact: De Novo Fact Review in the Federal
Appellate Court. 50 DUKE LAW JOURNAL 1427; See also, Lilly v. Virginia, 527 U.S. 116 (1999); Bose
Corp. v. Consumers Union, 466 U.S. 485 (1984); and Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293 (1962).
84

220 F. Supp. 667 (1963).

84

Stell v. Savannah-Chatham County Board of Education, 333 F. 2d 55, 61 (5th Cir. 1964). Note
that the State of Georgia is now part of the Eleventh Circuit.
85

Bakke, 438 U.S. at 314. According to legal scholar and Dean of the University of Virginia
School of Law, John Jeffries, a few years prior to the decision in Bakke, Justice Powell was recounted as
being “doubtful of the educational policy” supporting the University of Washington Law School’s
affirmative action policy challenged in DeFunis v. Odegaard, 416 U.S. 312 (1974). On the other hand,
Powell found the policy within the institution’s purview. John Jeffries, JUSTICE LEWIS F. POWELL, JR., 461
(1994).
In Bakke, briefs by amici, friends of the court, may have also played a role. On the one hand,
support for affirmative action in admissions was provided by the American Bar Association, the American
Civil Liberties Union, the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People, the Association of
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However, in interpreting Bakke and subsequent equal protection cases, district and
circuit courts treated the matter as a question of fact, an evidentiary issue. For example,
the district court in Johnson v. Board of Regents of the University of Georgia held that
diversity was not a compelling interest.86 In contrast to Justice Powell in Bakke, the
district court was not convinced by testimony of former University of Georgia President
Charles Knapp.87 Knapp testified on the basis of his experience as an administrator and
professor that “college-age students benefit educationally and economically from
interaction with peers drawn from diverse backgrounds and experiences” and that
“student heterogeneity -- including, but not limited to racial diversity – contributes to
education that also occurs inside the classroom.” The district court described Knapp’s
testimony as “speculation and syllogism.”88 The Eleventh Circuit also found the
University of Georgia’s defense lacking sufficient evidence, including a lack of statistical
support for the proposition that white candidates are not harmed at the middle tier of
admissions review, the tier in which the racial benefit was applied. The Court also cited
the lack of documented consideration of race-neutral alternatives.89

American Law Schools, as well as the American Association for Medical Colleges, several universities and
the National Council of Churches. Jewish organizations including the American Jewish Committee and the
Anti-Defamation League of B’nai B’rith generally opposed the policy, given the history of the use of
quotas to restrain Jewish American enrollments at elite institutions. The government weighed in as well
with the second African American Solicitor General Wade McCree, the first being Thurgood Marshall,
presenting a brief, written by conservative jurist then attorney Frank Easterbrook, which condemned the
sixteen-seat set aside as per se unconstitutional. Other parts of the Solicitor General’s brief reflected the
office infighting and were generally dismissed by Justice Powell. For more information on Justice Powell’s
thoughts on race conscious admissions see John Jeffries, JUSTICE LEWIS F. POWELL, JR., 455-501 (1994).
86

87

Johnson, 106 F.Supp. 2d 1362, 1375 (GA 2000), aff’d, 263 F.3d 1234 (11th Cir. 2001).
Id. at 1371-1372.

88

Id.

89

Johnson, 263 F.3d at 1258-1259.
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Similarly, the district court judges in McLaughlin v. Boston School Committee,90
Equal Open Enrollment Association v. Board of Education,91 Wessmann v. Gittens,92
Brewer v. West Irondequoit Central School District,93 Boston’s Children First v. City of
Boston,94 Comfort v. Lynn School Committee,95 and the other University of Georgia
cases, Wooden 96 and Tracy v. Board of Regents of the University of Georgia,97 found the
evidence presented insufficient to make a compelling case for diversity. In four of these
cases, McLaughlin, Equal Open Enrollment Association, Boston’s Children First, and
Comfort, the evidentiary question arose during preliminary hearings. As such, those
judges rendered opinions on the basis of a truncated record, without the benefit of full
discovery. In the cases of Smith v. University of Washington 98 and Parents Involved in
Community Schools v. Seattle School District No. 1,99 the Ninth Circuit suggested that if
presented with appropriately supportive evidence, and in the absence of state law banning
race conscious policies, that diversity may be found to be a compelling interest.100

90

938 F.Supp. 1001 (MA 1996).

91

937 F. Supp. 700 (OH 1996).

92

996 F. Supp. 120 (MA 1998), aff’d, 160 F.3d 790 (1st Cir.1998).

93

32 F.Supp. 2d 619 (NY 1999).

94

62 F.Supp. 2d 247 (MA 1999).

95

100 F.Supp. 2d 57 (MA 2000).

96

32 F.Supp. 2d 1370 (GA 1999).

97

59 F.Supp. 2d 1314 (GA 1999).

98

233 F.3d 1188 (9th Cir. 2000), cert. denied, 532 U.S. 1051 (2001).

99

285 F.3d 1236 (9th Cir. 2002).

100

Initiative 200 (I-200) foreclosed the use of race conscious policies in the regular course of
education in the State of Washington, the policy in Parents was found to be unlawful while the Smith case
was rendered moot. Consider the Ninth Circuit’s language in Parents:
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Yet, offering social science evidence did not guarantee a defendant win. Hence,
even with the benefit of expert testimony and a full record, the Boston Public School
District did not prevail in the Wessmann case.101 In addition to Wessmann, defendants in
Gratz and Grutter v. Bollinger, McLaughlin, Parents and Comfort offered scientifically
informed testimony to support respectively the policy goals of diversity, the remediation
of racial isolation, and de facto segregation.102 While the evidentiary issue was not
dispositive in all of these cases, within this set, only two, Grutterand Comfort, ultimately
permitted the continued use of the race conscious admissions policy in effect at the time
of litigation. At the level of individual judicial ruling, as listed in the table above, nine of
seventeen did rule in favor of defendants when social science evidence was offered. On
the surface, it seems as if the fairly daunting odds of winning race conscious admissions
suit are improved when social science evidence is employed. The next section further
explores the role played by social science evidence in race conscious admissions
decisions.

As federal judges, we are not charged with the arduous task of choosing between
these competing policy choices on their merits. Indeed, "how we judges might
weigh competing policy considerations is simply irrelevant." Rucker v. Davis,
203 F.3d 627, 639 (9th Cir. 2000), rev'd en banc, 237 F.3d 1113 (9th Cir. 2001),
rev'd sub nom. Dep't of Hous. and Urban Dev. v. Rucker, 122 S. Ct. 1230, 2002
U.S. LEXIS 2144, 2002 WL 451887 (U.S. Mar. 26, 2001). Instead, our proper
role is a limited one; we do not decide which choice is "better," but only whose
choice controls. We conclude that, in this case, the will of the School District
must give way to the will of the people of Washington.. Id. at 1252-1253.
101

160 F.3d at 808-809. (“While we appreciate the difficulty of the School Committee's task and
admire the values that it seeks to nourish noble ends cannot justify the deployment of constitutionally
impermissible means.”).
102

An expert witness was employed in Equal Open Enrollment Association (1996), however, the
evidence presented constituted alternatives to the race-conscious policy.
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B. The Role of Social Science Evidence in District and Circuit Court Judges
Decisions

Empirical evidence on the benefits of diversity is a product of social science
research on the effects of peers on student achievement and other educational, social, and
economic outcomes. While a relatively novel and growing body of literature, the gross
majority of works support the proposition that diversity is an important component of
broader educational strategies to provide optimal environments for teaching and learning.
In addition, when diversity is nurtured, a diverse student environment fosters qualities
within students, prompting them to reach out to others in society.103
At the cursory glance presented in Table 1, there seems to be some relationship
between defendant wins and the presence of social science evidence at trial. The reverse
seems also true: there are more plaintiff wins when social science is not offered. This
result follows from the manner in which race conscious admissions cases are built.
While plaintiffs bring the suit, defendant educational institutions use social science
evidence as an affirmative defense as to why they specifically consider race when
composing student bodies.104 Thus, the employment of social science evidence may
proxy the enthusiasm with which the defense makes its case. For example, as a result of
the rally of defendant experts by Lee Bollinger, former president of the University of
Michigan and named plaintiff in the Gratz and Grutter cases, the CIR recommended
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For a review of the literature on the benefits of diversity, see Jeffrey F. Milem, The Educational
Benefits of Diversity: Evidence from Multiple Sectors, in COMPELLING INTEREST: EXAMINING THE
EVIDENCE ON RACIAL DYNAMICS IN HIGHER EDUCATION (Mitchell Chang et al. eds., 2003).
104

During my dissertation research, I had the opportunity to meet with Michael E. Rosman,
attorney for the Center for Individual Rights (CIR), a conservative civil rights law firm which has played a
major role in these law suits on the side of plaintiffs. Rosman informed that rather than any concerted
effort on the part of the CIR to gather a team of experts for plaintiffs in race conscious admissions trials, the
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Kinley Larntz to testify on the behalf of plaintiffs. No such employment of experts was
used in either the Hopwood or Smith cases because defendants presented no social
science evidence in those trials.
It is difficult to disentangle whether the increase in defendant (educational
institution) wins when social science evidence is introduced is attributable to the
motivation of defendants or an “effect” of the data. In either event, it does not seem to be
the case that defendants are significantly more likely to win when social science evidence
is presented. What the addition of social science evidence seems to signal is a “fighting
chance,” an opportunity for defendant institutions to put forth a case in which a
reasonable judge could vote in favor.
Judges are not equally receptive to social science evidence, generally, and this
receptivity varies across issues. With regards to the present inquiry, there is least one
judge whose opinion suggests that social science evidence in the context of race
conscious admissions is irrelevant. Judge Bryan in Tuttle declined to permit Arlington
County to present evidence of the educational benefits of a diverse student body along
with evidence that race conscious policies are the most efficient method of attaining that
goal. Bryan explicitly states “[t]he court already has before it sufficient evidence to rule
on the merits … Even if racial classifications overwhelmingly increase the academic
success of defendants’ educational program, they remain unconstitutional”.105 Other
courts, such as the district court and Eleventh Circuit in Johnson, found the evidence
before the court lacking.

CIR treats cases individually and makes decisions with respect to the employment of experts for trial on a
case-by-case basis.
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Of the four cases asserting that diversity is not a compelling interest, social
science evidence is presented in only one. In that sole case, Judge Friedman waded
through data presented by both the plaintiffs and defendants in Grutter, and focused on
the statistical disparities in enrollment between whites and under-represented groups.
Specifically, the court found that the Michigan Law School places too heavy an emphasis
on race as an admissions factor.106 Using admissions statistics for the 1995-1996 school
year as an illustration, the court contended that the law school’s attempt to compose a
class that is racially representative of the applicant pool, violated its primary admission’s
goal of admitting student with the highest undergraduate grade point averages (GPA) and
LSAT exam scores given the significant gap between minority and non-minority
scores.107 According to this line of reasoning, enrollment for minority groups should
have been significantly less than their proportion in the applicant pool.108
Highlighting the disparities in admissions probabilities, Dr. Kinley Larntz,
Professor Emeritus of the Department of Applied Statistics at the University of
Minnesota, calculated the odds of admission for each racial group by LSAT and GPA
and found that the relative odds of admission were tens to hundreds of times greater if
one was not Caucasian. Based on this evidence the court concluded that “[o]ne does not
need to undergo sophisticated statistical analysis in order to see,” quoting Dr. Larntz,
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1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS at *12. Judge Bryan was also a bit perturbed that after he directly
ordered the district, in Tito, to stop using race as a factor in admissions, Arlington Traditional School
instituted a new policy, using race as a weight in selecting its student body by lottery.
106

Grutter, 137 F. Supp. 2d at 840.

107

Id. at 841.

108

Id. at 182
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“membership in certain groups is an extremely strong factor in the decision for
acceptance”.109
Dr. Stephen Raudenbaush, Professor of Education at the University of Michigan
and qualified by the court as an expert in statistics, found Dr. Larntz’s analysis flawed as
it did not consider the “soft factors,” such as quality of the undergraduate institution
(which may temper hard factors including grades and class rank), recommendations, and
experience. In fact, such “soft factors” may be determinant. Dr. Larntz also excluded
from his analysis episodes in which all students were rejected or all accepted, introducing
bias at the high and low ends of the GPA-LSAT distribution. In addition, as odds ratios
varied across the GPA-LSAT distribution, the summation of the distribution used wasa
not informative.110
The court rejected Raudenbush’s critique, finding that the grid itself revealed such
disparities in the odds of admission and that a statistician was not necessary for its
interpretation.111 Furthermore, the court specifically adopted the cell-by-cell analysis of
Dr. Larntz’s, which suggests that the race factor is accorded a heavy weight in the
admissions process.112
The Sixth Circuit assessed the social science data presented in Grutterdifferently.
According to the court, the statistical evidence of GPA and LSAT disparities between
majority and underrepresented minority groups do not present a double standard, as
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Id. at 841.

110

Id. at 841-842.

111

Id. at 842.

112

Id.
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suggested by the district court, but are the effect of the Harvard-style “racial plus”.113
This “racial plus” factor was not defined by Justice Powell, nor did Harvard append a list
comparing minority and non-minority SAT and GPA scores. Thus, without further
guidance on what is or is not permissible, the majority holds that “tip[ping] the balance”,
holding SAT and GPA scores constant then making a coin toss in favor of race, is
permissible.114
In addition, the concurrence by Judge Clay, joined by Judges Daughtry, Moore,
Cole, highlights an article in the Washington Post written by Goodwin Liu, a Washington
attorney and former Supreme Court law clerk, who firmly states that affirmative action
does not give spaces to minority students at the expense of whites.115 Liu points out that
Bakke’s scores were not only better than the average minority applicant, but also better
than the average applicant; thus, suggesting other factors at play, and that Bakke was not
merely competing for the 16 quota spaces.116
Evidence presented by former Harvard President, Derek Bok suggests that there
has been little change in this phenomenon since the days of Bakke. Judge Clay citing
Bok and William Bowen’s book, The Shape of the River, notes that within the Bowen and
Bok dataset, eliminating the “racial plus” increases the likelihood of admissions of whites
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Grutter, 288 F.3d at 746

114

Id.

115

Id. at 766-768.
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Id. According to the Liu article, with the quota Bakke’s probability of admissions was 2.7
percent (84 spots divided by the 3,109 applicants in the pool). Without the quota, Bakke’s probability of
success increases marginally to 3.2 percent or 100 spots divided by 3,109. For a fuller discussion see
Goodwin Liu, Affirmative action in higher education: The diversity rationale and the compelling interest
test, 33 HARVARD CIVIL RIGHTS-CIVIL LIBERTIES LAW REVIEW 381 (1998).
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from 25 to 26.5 percent.117 At the undergraduate level, 60 percent of blacks scoring
1200-1249 on SAT are admitted as compared to 19 percent of whites. Ceasin
affirmative action would increase the admissions rate of whites marginally, from 19 to 21
percent. Thus, the issue is not racial preferences to blacks, but the number of applicants
in the pool competing for limited number of places.118
With respect to the compelling aspects of diversity, Judge Clay quotes extensively
data on the benefits of a diverse student body presented by Patricia Y. Gurin, Professor of
Psychology at the University of Michigan and Interim Dean of the College of Literature,
Science and the Arts, and concludes that the evidence supports diversity as a compelling
interest. This data seemingly was ignored by the district court in Grutter. Summing up
his opinion, Clay states
the legal scholarship has indicated that a diverse student
body serves to promote our nation’s deep commitment to
educational equality, provides significant benefits to all
students – minorities and non-minorities alike, and does so
using a system which is not foreign to the admissions
process, but which allows for the benefit of all and not just
some. Thus, although the majority does base its holding
that diversity is a compelling governmental interest on
Justice Powell’s opinion in Bakke, it is clear that contrary
to the dissent’s criticism, this holding is not without
foundation even when standing alone. On the other hand,
the dissent’s conclusion that diversity cannot serve as a
compelling state interest for purposes of surviving
constitutional muster under the Equal Protection Clause, is
supported by neither legal scholarship nor empirical
evidence.119
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Id. See generally, Derek Bowen and William Bok, THE SHAPE OF THE RIVER, 1998.
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Id.
Id. at 763-764.
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The district court in Gratz, which ruled in favor of the undergraduate policy, also
cited Gurin’s work extensively. Dr. Gurin testified that “students learn better in a diverse
educational environment, and they are better prepared to become active participants in
our pluralistic, democratic society once they leave such a setting.”120 Her analysis
concludes that “students who experienced the most racial and ethnic diversity in
classroom settings and in informal interactions with peers showed the greatest
engagement in active thinking processes, growth in intellectual engagement and
motivation, and growth in intellectual and academic skills.”121
Exploring the role of expert testimony in judicial opinions in the Michigan cases
highlights the degree to which judges differ in their receptivity to social science evidence
and differences in gravitation towards experts for plaintiff students and defendant
educational institutions. In these cases, more than ten experts plus amici submitted
evidence,122 with varying quantities and quality of social scientific data, in the Gratz and
Grutter cases. By and large, defense witnesses outmatched plaintiffs’ in the quantity of
experts testifying, their credentials, and their breadth of current scholarship. Thus on the
larger of issue of whether racial diversity and its benefits could be considered a
compelling governmental interest, the defense in the Michigan cases won.123 They won

120

Gratz, 122 F.Supp. 2d at 822.

121

Grutter, 288 F.3d at 761. Guin’s work, as well as the testimony of other defense expert s in the
Michigan cases can be found http://www.umich.edu/ ~urel/admissions/legal/.
122
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See Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003) and Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244, 268 (2003)
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in part because Justice O’Connor was willing to defer to their educational expertise as
supported by data.124
The use of experts is less extensive in the K-12 cases and plaintiff and defendant
scholarship is more evenly matched. As such, it is somewhat easier in this context to
disengage the effect of motivation in bringing together a team of scholars from the effect
of the persuasive power of the social science evidence presented.
In Parents, data presented by the district included a statistical representation of
racial isolation and de facto segregation in Seattle’s schools. With the high school choice
policy only one of the high schools, Garfield, was in racial balance.125 Without the
policy, the incoming ninth grade classes at the most popular schools were estimated to be
79.2 percent non-white at Franklin, 30.5 percent non-white at Hale, 33 percent at Ballard,
41.1 percent at Roosevelt. In a region where racial and ethnic minorities are in the
majority, 60 percent, minority students would compose only one-third to 40 percent of
four of the five preferred high schools. Under the policy, composition of those classes
shifted from a range of 40.6 percent to nearly 60 percent.126

needed to guarantee admission, to every single ‘underrepresented minority’ applicant solely because of
race, is not narrowly tailored to achieve educational diversity.”).
124

539 U.S. at 328 (“The Law School's educational judgment that such diversity is essential to its
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further discussion of Justice O’Connor’s deference in Grutter see Angelo N. Ancheta, Contextual Strict
Scrutiny and Race-Conscious Policy Making, 36 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 21 (2004). Cf., Gail Heriot, Thoughts
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In addition, the district hired Dr. William Trent, Professor of Educational Policy
Studies at the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champlain, to testify. Trent presented four
rationales for pursing the diversity goal, each grounded in data. First, he contended that
diversity provides opportunity and experience. To support his claim, he relied on
desegregation research suggesting that educational experiences lead to more networking
in higher education and employment, which is especially beneficial to minority students
who are isolated from legacy networks.127 Second, he offered that diversity improves the
achievement of minority students through access to better teachers and advanced
curriculum. Both minority and non-minority improve critical thinking skills through
cross-cultural dialogue.128 Third, Trent asserted that diversity imbues civic values,
improves race relations, decreases prejudicial attitudes, provides a more democratic,
inclusive experience for all students, and ultimately works to break down racial and
cultural classifications.129 Finally, diversity in school works towards societal
desegregation as employment opportunities improve and minorities, in turn, seek
suburban housing.130
The plaintiffs called Dr. David Armor, Professor of Public Policy at George
Mason University, to critique Dr. Trent’s analysis. But as Dr. Armor ultimately admitted,
“there is general agreement by both experts and the general public that integration is a
desirable policy goal mainly for the social benefit of increased information and
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understanding about the cultural and social differences among the various racial and
ethnic groups.”131 As such, the district court found Dr. Armor’s testimony unsuccessful
in casting doubt on Dr. Trent’s presentation.132 While the defendants in this case
prevailed at the district court, at the Ninth Circuit, the court found that the admissions
policy violated Washington State Law.133
Dr. Trent also testified in the Wessmann case.134 Here, Trent’s analysis focused
on the lingering effects of past discrimination. 135 Trent presented the results of racial
climate surveys distributed to teachers, students, and parents in Kansas which found that
higher teacher expectations correlate with higher student achievement. On the other
hand, low teacher expectations correlate with prior discrimination and lower student
achievement.136 Finding that the Boston School System was previously declared unitary
and that the lingering vestiges of past discrimination were insignificant, the First Circuit
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was not persuaded by Dr. Trent’s testimony. The First Circuit found this evidence
inapplicable, as it did not directly address the question of diversity. Drawing parallels
from the Supreme Court’s analysis of the City of Richmond’s data mismatch in the
Croson case, the Court found that research on the vestiges of prior discrimination in
Kansas did not support the diversity rationale advanced by defendants.137
The court also critiqued the data collected by Trent as well as the testimony of an
additional expert, finding the testimony of each wanting in methodological quality and
connection to the diversity justification.138 The primary fault the court found with Dr.
Trent’s testimony was that a formal evaluation of the Boston school system had not been
conducted, and that the Boston-specific evidence proffered was based upon less than
systematic observances and interviews.139 Similarly, the Court found evidence given by
then Deputy Superintendent Janice Jackson, testifying in an expert rather than
administrative capacity, regarding the association between teacher expectations and
student outcomes wanting for lack of scientific rigor. Extrapolating from Trent’s
research on Kansas and applying it to the Boston Public Schools, Jackson employed a
technique called Teacher Expectations and Student Achievement (TEASA), and found
through observation that teacher expectations of minority students were generally low.140
However, Jackson’s methodology was poorly described and she failed to document
critical aspects of her observations, such as the number of schools, classrooms, and

137

Id. at 804-805.

138

Id. at 805-806.

139

Id.

140

Id. at 806.

39

people observed. As such the Court was concerned, appropriately, about the scientific
validity and reliability of Jackson’s work.141
The court also heard what it deemed anecdotal testimony from school district
administrators. The First Circuit then held that on the basis of the record before the court,
the case for continued efforts to enroll more students of color in Boston’s prestigious
examination schools was not compelling.142 Note that the Court’s opinion was not
unanimous. Judge Lipez, in dissent, found Dr. Trent’s testimony both relevant and
compelling in light of the city of Boston’s history of racial discord.143
In Comfort, Dr. Gary Orfield of the Harvard Civil Rights Project submitted an
affidavit stating that racially mixed education is essential to prepare students to live in a
pluralistic society.144 In addition, using a comparison of Lynn, Massachusetts School
District demographic data to other studies conducted by Orfield, there is evidence that
dismantling the transfer policy’s racial component would detrimentally affect the
academic performance of minority students.145
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Here, Judge Gertner was able to distinguish the case in Comfort from Wessmann
where the First Circuit held that the diversity inquiry was fact-bound, and given the facts
before it, could not rule that diversity was a compelling interest.146 No social science
evidence was proffered on the issue of diversity in the Wessmann case, although experts,
including Dr. William Trent, testified to the lingering effects of segregation. Judge
Gertner found that Professor Orfield’s testimony was directly relevant as the data was
both specific to Lynn, Massachusetts and was able to link student diversity to educational
benefits, in particular student achievement. 147 Given Orfield’s testimony, a preliminary
injunction was averted as plaintiffs could not meet their burden in proving their
likelihood of success on the merits.148
In sum, in the period between Bakke and the Michigan cases, more plaintiffs won
race conscious admissions cases. While there are too few cases from which a general
pattern can be ascertained, defendant educational institutions persuaded more judges to
rule in their favor when social science evidence was presented. When social science
research is added, the rate of defendant victories improves to 50-50. As such, the
addition of social science research allows defendants a “fighting chance,” lending support
for the continued use of experts at these trials.
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IV.

Conclusion: Data-Supported Deference in Grutter and Beyond

Author of the majority opinions in Croson and Adarand, Justice O’Connor
provided the swing vote in the Court’s 5-4 decision in Grutter, upholding the Michigan
law school’s race conscious admissions policy. Since her appointment by President
Reagan in 1981, O’Connor consistently has maintained a conservative stance in the
government contracts and employment contexts, voting against each of the race
conscious policies brought before the Court. Yet, in the education context O’Connor
hinted support for race conscious policies, as is heard in her Wygant concurrence. Even
in Adarand she holds out that strict scrutiny need not be fatal in fact. But as Justice
Ginsberg’s Adarand dissent highlights, O’Connor’s actions suggested otherwise, as
during O’Connor’s tenure on the Court, she supported no race conscious policy,
including the one upheld in Paradise. That was true until Grutter v. Bollinger.
Overall, O’Connor’s stance on diversity as a compelling governmental interest
was opaque until her announcement in Grutter. During the oral argume nts of these cases,
none of O’Connor’s questions regarded the educational benefits of diversity. While
reconciling the sociological concept of critical mass within the context of women in law
school with the critical mass of African American students on campus, O’Connor’s
inquiry focused mainly on the narrow tailoring inquiry.
In O’Connor’s majority decision in Grutter, she specifically endorsed diversity as
a compelling interest as proffered by Justice Powell. Yet rather than announcing that
diversity was clearly compelling, she deferred to the educational judgment of the

42

University of Michigan based upon the social science evidence presented.149 So here,
social science did play a role. It permitted Justice O’Connor the opportunity to see the
degree to which the University of Michigan thought through its admissions policy and
Michigan’s willingness to support its educational judgment. Therefore, it seems that this
research was just the evidence needed to allow this swing-voting judge to preserve the
race-conscious admissions option for educational institutions seeking diverse student
bodies.
In conclusion, while the overall legal developments in the area of race conscious
admissions suggest that plaintiffs are more likely to win these suits, where most defense
victories have been made, social science evidence was presented. In effect, social science
research seems to give college/ university defendants a fighting chance. Towards that
end, counsel should, as feasible, include social science research as part of their defense,
because one never knows when it may have sway. That said, I do not think it is efficient
in subsequent suits to employ the number of social scientists used in the Michigan cases.
Data is but one means of persuasion, which alone does not assure victory.
Should institutions use the leeway provided by Grutter to continue race conscious
policies, specific social science indicators of the relationship between diversity and
educational outcomes as they relate to your campus, your educational purpose and
mission, should be employed. In that manner the data folly of The City of Richmond in
Croson, the utilization of national data to reflect a local condition will be avoided. How
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do you develop that data? Look at your campus and other campuses in your region. The
researcher you need may be right under your nose.
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